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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3405 
___________ 
 
 
IN RE:  JEFFREY NATHAN SCHIRRIPA, 
      Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-03649) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
October 22, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 3, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Jeffrey Nathan Schirripa, filed this petition for a writ of mandamus 
seeking an order directing the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
to rule on a motion for relief from final judgment which was filed pursuant to Federal 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 60 on July 20, 2015.1  For the following reasons, we will deny 
the petition. 
 A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy that is invoked only in extraordinary 
situations.  See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  To limit the use of 
the writ to such extraordinary circumstances, a petitioner must show: (1) both a clear and 
indisputable right to the writ, and (2) that he has no other adequate means to obtain the 
relief desired.  See Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 
Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403).   
Although a district court retains discretion over the manner in which it controls its 
docket, see In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982), an 
appellate court may issue a writ of mandamus when an “undue delay is tantamount to a 
failure to exercise jurisdiction[.]”  Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), 
superseded in part on other grounds by 3d Cir. L.A.R. 24.1(c).  Here, there is no basis for 
granting the petition for a writ of mandamus on the basis of undue delay.  While 
Schirripa argues that his motion for relief from judgment has been “unreasonably 
neglected/delayed” by the District Court’s “inability (or unwillingness)” to rule on the 
motion despite a “clear and undisputable obligation” to do so, we note that Schirripa’s 
motion was filed approximately three months ago.  We do not hesitate to conclude that 
                                              
1  Schirripa asserts that his motion for relief from judgment was filed on June 25, 
2015, but was “misplaced” by the District Court Clerk and was not docketed until July 
20, 2015. 
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this period of time does not rise to the level of undue delay.2  We see no reason to believe 
that the District Court will not adjudicate the motion in due course.   Thus, we conclude 
that there is no basis here for an extraordinary remedy. 
Because our intervention is not warranted, we will deny the petition for a writ of 
mandamus 
                                              
2  Even if we were to consider Schirripa’s motion as filed on June 25, 2015, the date 
he alleges, rather than the date the motion was docketed, this apparent four-month period 
of time still does not constitute undue delay warranting our intervention.   
